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BY JULY  1991 economists in both the Soviet Union and the West were 
converging  toward  an agreed  economic reform  strategy  for the USSR. 
That  pre-coup  reform  strategy  rested on four  pillars: 
-Macroeconomic  stabilization,  which requires the virtual elimina- 
tion of the budget  deficit  and  tight  control  over credit  to both the gov- 
ernment  and  enterprises; 
-Price  liberalization,  an essential step not only toward  the creation 
of markets  but also toward  restoring  macroeconomic  balance  in a sit- 
uation  in which subsidies  are as large  as the budget  deficit; 
-Current-account  convertibility of the ruble at a heavily  devalued 
exchange rate, accompanied  by the removal of restrictions  on im- 
ports  and  exports  of goods and  by rapid  progress  toward  low levels of 
tariffs  and other  trade  taxes; 
-Privatization  of  enterprises  and property  as rapidly as possible, 
with immediate  corporatization  of large  state enterprises  as an inter- 
mediate  step. 
Implementation  of such a reform  program  would have posed techni- 
cal and  political  difficulties  far  greater  than  those now besetting  Eastern 
Europe and would, in the short run, have imposed hardships  on many 
people. The program  also would have had to be undergirded  by a fifth 
pillar,  a social safety net, and by Western  financial  assistance, to limit 
the inevitable  short-term  declines in consumption  and  other  disruptions 
that  would  have threatened  its political  viability. 
Today, the premise of firm  central control on which the consensus 
program  was based is obsolete. Analysis of reform  and aid plans must 
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therefore  start  by examining  alternative  economic  frameworks  that  may 
emerge  from the terminal  phase of Soviet history. Crucially,  aid plans 
have to adapt to the uncertainties  surrounding  both the framework  in 
which they will be implemented  and the course of developments  in the 
former  Soviet Union. 
After describing  two alternative  scenarios for the next few years, I 
discuss reforms  that  can be undertaken  within  those frameworks  and  the 
role of Western  assistance. I argue  that although  many  details  of the re- 
form  plans  will have to wait  for greater  clarity  about  the economic struc- 
ture  linking  the successor states of the Soviet Union, there is much  that 
the republics  and whatever  central  authority  emerges can do to imple- 
ment parts  of the pre-coup  reform  strategy.  Similarly,  although  general 
balance  of payments  support  from  the West  cannot  be delivered  until  the 
recipients are identified,  there is an important-and by now generally 
recognized-role  for immediate  Western  involvement  through  the pro- 
vision of humanitarian  aid and technical assistance. I conclude by 
stressing  the need for coordination  of Western  assistance  and  proposing 
a coordinating  mechanism. 
Two Scenarios 
The struggle  over the political and economic arrangements  within 
which  the successor states of the Soviet Union will operate  will continue 
for years. The framework  that emerges within the next few months is 
unlikely  to be final:  at this early stage of reaction  against  the strong  cen- 
tralization  of the Soviet Union, the pressures  of decentralization  domi- 
nate;  later, as the costs of fragmentation  and  the advantages  of coopera- 
tion become obvious, the republics are likely to move toward more 
integrated  and  cooperative  arrangements. 
Logically,  the possible  frameworks  range  from  a strong  federal  struc- 
ture similar  to that  of the United States, to a Latin  American  solution  of 
totally independent  republics  each pursuing  its own economic policies 
within the world economy. I consider two less extreme scenarios that 
could develop in the near  future. 
In the first,  the union scenario,  the republics  form  an economic  union 
in which there is a single currency,  controlled  by a single central  bank, 
and  free trade  among  the republics.  (For  basic data  on the republics,  see Stanley Fischer  291 
Table 1.  USSR: Territory and Population of Republics, as of January 1, 1990 
Population 
Territoty  Distri-  Growth  Density 
Thousand  Percent  In  bution  rate  per sq.  Percent 
Regioni  sq. km.  of USSR  thousands  (percent)  (percent)a  km.b  urban 
USSRC  22,403  100.0  288,624  100.0  0.66  12.9  66 
Slavic 
RSFSR  17,075  76.2  148,041  51.3  0.43  8.7  74 
Ukraine  604  2.7  51,839  18.0  0.26  5.9  67 
Belorussia  208  0.9  10,259  3.6  0.58  49.4  66 
BalticIMoldavia 
Estonia  45  0.2  1,583  0.5  0.89  35.1  72 
Latvia  65  0.3  2,687  0.9  0.26  41.7  71 
Lithuania  65  0.3  3,723  1.3  0.64  57.1  68 
Moldova  34  0.2  4,362  1.5  0.55  129.4  47 
Caucasus 
Georgia  70  0.3  5,456  1.9  0.24  78.3  56 
Armenia  30  0.1  3,293  1.1  0.15  110.5  68 
Azerbaijan  87  0.4  7,131  2.5  1.32  82.3  54 
Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan  2,717  12.1  16,691  5.8  0.94  6.1  57 
Cenitral  Asia 
Turkmenistan  488  2.2  3,622  1.3  2.49  7.4  45 
Uzbekistan  447  2.0  20,322  7.0  2.09  45.4  41 
Tadzhikistan  143  0.6  5,248  1.8  2.72  36.7  32 
Kirgizia  199  0.9  4,367  1.5  1.79  22.0  38 
Comnposition  by regions 
Slavic  17,886  79.8  210,139  72.8  0.40  11.7  73 
Baltic/Moldova  209  0.9  12,355  4.3  0.60  59.3  62 
Caucasus  186  0.8  15,880  5.5  0.70  85.3  56 
Kazakhstan  2,717  12.1  16,691  5.8  0.94  6.1  57 
Central Asia  1,277  5.7  33,559  11.6  2.20  26.3  40 
Source:  Adapted from International Monetary Fund and others (1991, vol.  1, table 3, p. 206). 
a.  Percentage growth in population  1989-90. 
b.  Number of people per square kilometer. 
c.  USSR  territory includes  the  127,300 square kilometers  of the White Sea  and the Sea of  Azov,  which  are not 
included in the area of individual republics. 
tables 1 and 2.) The central  government  has spending  responsibilities, 
primarily  for defense, but no independent  power to tax and is financed 
by contributions  from the republics. This arrangement  is close to the 
framework  of the Union Treaty  that  was to have been signed  on August 
20, 1991,  the Tuesday  of the coup.' 
1. The key difference  between  the union  scenario  discussed  here and  the framework 
envisaged  in most  reform  plans,  and  most  explicitly  in the Allison-Yavlinsky  "Window  of 
Opportunity"  Plan  (1991),  is that  in the union  scenario  discussed  in this  paper,  the central 
government  has no independent  taxing  authority.  Although  the Window  of Opportunity 
provides  a more  coherent  framework  for  reform  than  those  discussed  here,  it does not  cur- 
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Table 2.  USSR: Distribution of Population, Net Material Product, and Budget Revenue, 
by Union Republic 
Percent 
State budget 
Net material  product  revenue  Deliveries  to 
retained by  other  Exports 
Republic  Population  Total  Inidustry  Agriculture  republic  republics  abroad 
Armenia  1.1  0.9  1.2  0.7  1.4  63.7  1.4 
Azerbaijana  2.5  1.7  1.7  2.2  1.8  58.7  3.7 
Belorussia  3.6  4.2  4.0  4.9  4.7  69.6  6.5 
Estonia  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.8  66.5  7.4 
Georgiaa  1.9  1.6  1.4  2.1  1.8  53.7  3.9 
Kazakhstan  5.8  4.3  2.5  6.1  6.1  30.9  3.0 
Kirgizia  1.5  0.8  0.6  1.3  1.2  50.2  1.2 
Latvia  0.9  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.3  64.1  5.7 
Lithuania  1.3  1.4  1.1  1.9  1.7  60.9  5.9 
Moldova  1.5  1.2  1.0  1.8  1.4  62.1  3.4 
RSFSRa  51.4  61.1  61.9  18.0  55.3  18.0  8.6 
Tadzhikstan  1.8  0.8  0.5  1.2  1.1  41.8  6.9 
Turkmenistan  1.2  0.7  0.4  1.2  0.9  50.7  4.2 
Ukraine  18.0  16.3  16.7  17.1  15.9  39.1  6.7 
Uzbekistana  6.9  3.3  2.3  5.2  4.7  43.2  7.4 
Residual  ...  ...  3.0  4.4  ... 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  ...  ... 
Source:  IMF and others  (1990, app. table 3, p. 51). Republican population is measured as a percent of  1989 total 
Soviet  population.  Net  material product is measured at current prices and as a percent of  1989 totals.  State revenue 
is  measured  as a percent  of the total from the  1990 plan. Deliveries  and exports  are measured as a percent  of net 
material product in current prices. 
a.  Azerbaijan  contains  one  autonomous  republic; Georgia  contains  two  autonomous  republics;  Russia  contains 
sixteen;  and Uzbekistan  contains  one. 
In the second,  the regrouping  scenario,  the republics agree to main- 
tain unrestricted  trade  but have the right  to introduce  their  own curren- 
cies and their  own armies.2  As the scenario  plays out, several republics 
including  Russia  form  a weak federal  structure  (the Union of Sovereign 
States, or the USS), which would use the ruble and maintain  common 
defense forces. Ukraine and perhaps other republics introduce their 
own currencies  and  operate  as independent  countries,  while, at least ini- 
tially, maintaining  a common  economic space. After  contentious  negoti- 
ations, the assets and  liabilities  of the Soviet Union  would  be distributed 
among  the republics.  Control  over nuclear  weapons would be assigned 
to the USS. 
No matter  what arrangements  are made among  the remaining  12 re- 
publics, the Baltics will have to negotiate transition and separation 
2. The two scenarios  are closely related  to the economic-constitutional  frameworks 
proposed  in September  1991  by Grigory  Yavlinsky  and  Stanislav  Shatalin  respectively. Stanley  Fischer  293 
agreements  from the Soviet Union. They are likely to introduce  their 
own currencies,  establish  their  own common  market,  and attempt  grad- 
ually  to integrate  into Europe. 
Consequences  with Union Scenario 
Serious reform  would be possible under either the union or the re- 
grouping  scenario,  though  each framework  has built-in  weaknesses. 
In a successful union scenario, a strong, independent  central bank 
keeps tight  control  over the quantity  of money, rapidly  establishes  con- 
vertibility  at a fixed exchange rate, and thereby  provides essential ele- 
ments of both macroeconomic  stability  and price reform.  At the same 
time, the republics  contribute  enough  revenue to the center  to keep the 
central  government  budget  close to balance,  reducing  pressures  to print 
money  or to borrow.  In this scenario  the republics  quickly  develop fiscal 
frameworks  that allow them to balance their own budgets. They main- 
tain free trade, imposing  no restrictions  on movements  of goods or on 
interrepublican  payments. 
Within  this stable macroeconomic  framework,  both the central and 
the republican  governments  implement  structural  reforms.  The bulk of 
the structural  reforms,  especially in the areas of privatization  and  price 
liberalization,  are  carried  out at the republican  level, as they would  have 
been even under  the pre-coup  strong-center  reform  plans. 
Although  all this could happen, it is not likely. The weakness of the 
union scenario  is the weakness of the United States under  the Articles 
of Confederation:  the republics  are unlikely  to provide  the central  gov- 
ernment  with the resources  needed to meet its mandated  expenditures. 
In evidence, note that the republics  refused  to give independent  tax au- 
thority to the center during  the pre-coup negotiations  over the Union 
Treaty-a  time  when the center  was much  stronger  than  it is now. At the 
same time, the draft  treaty  assigned an extensive range  of responsibili- 
ties to the center, including  defense. An optimist  might  argue  that  a tight 
revenue  constraint  would  produce  a massive and  rapid  reduction  in mili- 
tary  spending,  but the political  and social consequences of a rapid  disin- 
tegration  of the military  make  this unlikely. 
What  would happen  next in the union scenario  depends to some ex- 
tent on the strength  of the central  bank. Most likely the central  govern- 
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deficit, a process that ends in hyperinflation.  However, hyperinflation 
is possible even if formally  defined  money growth  could be controlled: 
treasuries  lacking  fiscal resources  tend to emit money-like  instruments. 
Or perhaps  trade taxes would be imposed. At some point, the budget 
problems  of the center would become overwhelming,  economic disor- 
der would again  intensify, and a new economic framework  would have 
to be created. Some republics  might choose economic independence, 
while others that wanted to remain  could negotiate the formation  of a 
new union  with a stronger  center. 
The republics  too would  face major  budgetary  difficulties  in the union 
scenario. They do not now have adequate  tax systems and would very 
likely have to borrow to cover expenses. Some of them also lack the 
managerial  capacity  to implement  the structural  changes, including  pri- 
vatization,  contained  in the reform  plans. 
Consequences  with Regrouping  Scenario 
In the regrouping  scenario, successful reform  requires  each issuer of 
currency  to maintain  control over the quantity  of money and to refrain 
from  restricting  interrepublican  trade.  As in the union  scenario,  the bulk 
of the structural  reforms-privatization and  price  liberalization-would 
be carried  out at the republican  level. 
If each republican  central bank were strong and independent,  with 
clear policy guidelines-for  instance, maintenance  of a fixed exchange 
rate for each currency against the other republican currencies and 
against  a basket of Western  currencies-the  regrouping  scenario  could 
provide  monetary  stability.  But newly independent  republics  that have 
insisted on the right  to issue their own currencies  as symbols of their 
sovereignty  and  that  have weak tax systems are likely to print  money to 
cover budget  deficits. They are also likely, for two reasons, to interfere 
with  interrepublican  trade  and  thereby  to destroy  the common  economic 
space. First, if they inflate  but also seek to maintain  fixed  exchange  rates 
against  a relatively stable currency, they will find the current  account 
worsening  and  will tend  to impose  import  restrictions.  Second, the natu- 
ral inclination  of political systems is to protect domestic industry,  and 
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a prolonged  period  of state intervention  in the economy.3  Thus, the ten- 
dency to destroy the common  economic space is the inherent  weakness 
of the regrouping  scenario. 
Where  does the regrouping  scenario  lead? If the USS can maintain  a 
reasonably  stable currency  and pace of reform, then some smaller  re- 
publics  that chose full independence  might  eventually  join an economic 
union with the USS, thereby giving up their currency  and agreeing  to 
maintain  unrestricted  trade.  Ukraine  and  others  of the smaller  republics 
might attempt  to negotiate a separate economic union with the USS, 
pledging  to allow unrestricted  trade.  More  likely they would  move away 
from  the USS, becoming  more  independent,  maintaining  their  own cur- 
rencies and trade restrictions, experimenting  with import-substitution 
policies, and repeating  many of the disappointing  experiences of Latin 
America. 
Reform within the Regrouped Soviet Union 
Although the State Council is supposed to choose the economic 
framework  before the end of September,  its decision is unlikely  to end 
the contest  between  the center  and  the republics.  At present,  regrouping 
seems a more  likely outcome  than  the union  scenario.  Regrouping  would 
produce  a USS of six to nine republics  (with  Russia  at its core), an inde- 
pendent  Ukraine,  and republics  like Azerbaijan,  Georgia,  and Moldova 
wanting  independence  but without  much  external  support. 
The USS, the unit built around  Russia and perhaps  even consisting 
solely of Russia, would  be the largest  and  most important  of the succes- 
sor states to the Soviet Union. Reform  in the USS could proceed along 
the lines envisaged  in the pre-coup  reform  plans and summarized  in the 
introduction.  There  would  be rapid  moves toward  budget  balance  within 
the Union and its constituent  republics,  convertibility  of the ruble at a 
fixed  exchange  rate, price  liberalization,  the beginnings  of privatization, 
and  the introduction  of necessary social safety nets. 
3. Logically,  the collapse of the centrally  planned  economies should  incline policy- 
makers  toward  free markets,  and in a general  way it does. However, there is also clear 
evidence  that  some republican  leaders  regard  the breakup  of the USSR as the occasion  to 
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Similar  reforms  could  be introduced  and  implemented  in Ukraine  and 
the other independent  republics.  Those republics  would have to decide 
on their exchange rate system and exchange rate peg, if any. The pre- 
sumption  is that  republics  would prefer  to peg to a Western  currency  or 
a basket  of Western  currencies;  if the ruble  is stabilized,  however, there 
are  likely  to be advantages  for some republics  in pegging  to it. In consid- 
ering  the regrouping  scenario, it is only realistic  to expect that some re- 
publics will show virtually  no interest  in reform  and to note that others 
lack the capacity. 
One of the key lessons of the Eastern European  reform  experience 
should be heeded in reforming  the Soviet Union: if possible, existing 
trading  relationships  should not be destroyed too rapidly. The abrupt 
end of Council for Mutual  Economic Assistance trade at the start of 
1991,  and  the shift  to hard  currency  payments,  has been a major  contrib- 
utor to  the recessions now besetting Eastern European countries. 
Therefore,  some transitional  arrangements  are needed to deal with ex- 
isting inter- and intrarepublican  trade. A variety of mechanisms, in- 
cluding  a temporary  payments  union,4  have been proposed  and  urgently 
need further  study. 
One possibility is to phase out existing barter  arrangements  gradu- 
ally-for  example, by maintaining  existing trading  partners  for three 
years while, over that  period, reducing  to zero the quantities  scheduled 
for delivery  under  each contract.  In addition,  any such existing  contract 
to deliver goods could be terminated  by agreement  of both parties. All 
new contracts  would be negotiated  at new liberalized  prices. Attempts 
to maintain  existing  contracts  have been breaking  down in the past year, 
however, and  this approach  may not be workable  in practice. 
If abrupt  adjustments  in quantities  are disruptive,  what about price 
changes?  Should  price  reform  and  convertibility  also be introduced  only 
gradually?  The basic answer to both questions is no. At the margin, 
prices on all contracts should be liberalized,  and new trades should be 
free to take place at those liberalized  prices.' In addition,  the currency 
should  be convertible  on current  account. Tariffs  and trade  taxes could 
be used to bring  domestic  prices in line with world  prices  gradually;  but, 
4.  See, for instance,  the discussion  in Kenen  (1991). 
5. Experience  with U.S. oil price controls  that tried  to distinguish  between new and 
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in any case, this process should not last more than three years, with a 
large  share  of the adjustment  being  made  immediately. 
In brief, economic reform  along  the lines outlined  in the introduction 
is possible in each of the successor units of the Soviet Union. Mainte- 
nance of open trading  links is less likely the greater  the number  of suc- 
cessor states, but the desirable directions of reform are in any case 
clearly independent  of the particular  political solutions that eventually 
emerge-and many of the reforms  would have had to be undertaken  at 
the republican  level whatever  the final  degree  of centralization. 
The Role of Western Aid 
The  argument  for Western  aid  before  the failed  coup was that  it would 
support  the forces of reform  against  its enemies, particularly  in the army 
and the KGB. With the opponents of reform  totally discredited,  what 
reasons  now remain  for providing  aid? 
The West still has an interest in a peaceful transition  from commu- 
nism  to a market  economy and democracy  in the successor states of the 
Soviet Union. In the short  run,  chaos in the region  brings  a threat  of Yu- 
goslav-type  civil war, further  economic difficulties  for Eastern  Europe, 
and immigration  to Western  Europe. Chaos also raises the question of 
the disposition  of nuclear  weapons, an issue that  has been handled  very 
delicately  in analyzing  the coup attempt. 
In the longer  run, the rest of the world will benefit  from Soviet inte- 
gration  into the international  economic community.  The Soviet Union 
is extraordinarily  rich in raw materials,  is the world's largest  producer 
of oil, and  will be a massive market  for the West. It is the next economic 
frontier. Further, most Western economies, especially the  United 
States, will benefit  from the peace dividend  that is already  accruing  as 
the Cold  War  disappears. 
Three  types of aid have to be considered: 
-humanitarian aid comprising  food and medicines; 
-technical  assistance for activities that will be republican  responsi- 
bilities; 
-general  purposefinancial  aid, such as currency stabilization funds 
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Humanitarian  assistance can and should be provided  to Soviet citi- 
zens whatever  the ultimate  economic  arrangement  among  the republics. 
Besides the humanitarian  reasons for providing  such aid, it is a highly 
visible form of support,  which will have a large political impact. Food 
aid can go directly  to the republics,  through  mechanisms  that are being 
worked out now. Distribution  of food is an important  problem, which 
will be much easier to handle  if food prices are decontrolled  and some 
state trucks  are  privatized:  it is amazing  to see how food can move when 
there  are incentives  for it to do so. In addition  to food, the Soviets them- 
selves emphasize  their  need for medical  supplies. 
Some economic reforms  will have to be undertaken  at the republican 
level no matter  what  the final  political  arrangements.  Most privatization 
will be a republican  and municipal  task, as will the decontrol  of prices. 
Tax systems have to be created  or improved  at the republican  level; so 
too do legal systems and the framework  for foreign investment;  much 
agricultural  reform  can be done at the republican  level; the same holds 
for financial  system reform.  Technical  assistance is urgently  needed in 
all these areas. Reports are that while foreign experts are falling over 
each other  looking  for work  in Moscow, they are  very thin  on the ground 
in the republics. 
Technical  assistance  to the republics  can and should  begin  soon. The 
European  Community  is ready and willing to move. So is the World 
Bank, whose board  has approved  a $30 million  fund  for technical  assis- 
tance. Bilateral  Western  assistance  is also expected. Some of the techni- 
cal assistance may need to be accompanied  by financial  assistance, but 
this will be on a small  scale. Some of the technical  assistance  should  take 
the form  of advisory  teams  that  are  placed  in the capitals  of the republics 
rather  than  in Moscow. These teams should  be available  on a continuing 
basis to help set up the new economic  framework  and  to assist in the im- 
plementation  of reforms. 
Thus important  Western  assistance-namely,  humanitarian  aid and 
technical assistance to the republics-can  begin immediately, should 
begin  immediately,  and is likely to do so. This aid does not have to wait 
for clarity about the economic and political future of the Soviet re- 
publics. 
However, large-scale  general  financial  assistance  cannot  be provided 
until  it is clear to whom the assistance should  go. For instance, there is Stanley Fischer  299 
no point setting  up a ruble stabilization  fund when the future  currency 
arrangements  of the USS and its successor states are still uncertain. 
Similarly,  typical International  Monetary  Fund (IMF)-type balance of 
payments loans that support macroeconomic stabilization  cannot be 
provided  until it is known which governments  will have the power to 
bring  macroeconomic  stability. 
Should  the West attempt  to shape the transition  in the Soviet Union 
through the leverage of large-scale financial assistance? Yes,  in the 
sense that aid should flow only to governments  reforming  in a demo- 
cratic  and market-oriented  direction.  Yes, in that  the West has an inter- 
est in arrangements  that reduce the risk of chaos. Beyond that lies a 
question  for politicians  rather  than economists to answer:  whether  it is 
in the interests of the West to attempt  to maintain  a large centralized 
state in the former Soviet Union by announcing  that balance of pay- 
ments support  would be available  only to an all-union  government.  My 
judgment  is that the West should avoid that temptation,  except to the 
extent that it believes it can help keep the transition  to the new arrange- 
ments more peaceful than it otherwise would be. It is difficult  to see a 
Western  interest in maintaining  a single successor state; nor would an 
announcement  that aid would be available  only to an all-union  govern- 
ment  be credible,  since the same  motives  that  justify aid  to the union  jus- 
tify aid to the successor states. 
Because general financial  assistance cannot flow until a new eco- 
nomic framework  is in place, Soviet leaders have strong  incentives to 
agree on their economic constitution. Reform  plans, including  the de- 
tails of Western  assistance, can be worked  out as soon as an economic 
constitution  goes into effect. The USS and those republics  that  become 
fully independent  should  gain  full membership  in the international  agen- 
cies, through  which much  of the needed  financial  aid will flow. 
Although  the Group  of Seven (G7) has held back on aid on several 
key occasions, Western  inhibitions  about economic aid are fast disap- 
pearing.  Food and medical  aid and large-scale  technical assistance are 
about  to begin  flowing.  The West will have to show flexibility  in dealing 
with different  levels of government,  and quite  possibly with changes in 
governmental  structure.  It will also have to preserve flexibility  in con- 
sidering  balance  of payments  support  and  in deciding  when such support 
is warranted.  But since it will take time to figure  out the dimensions  of 300  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1991 
the needed support, work should begin now, even before the West 
knows the political  framework  in which it will be delivered,  or whether 
it will be delivered. 
Preliminary  calculations about aid suggest two important  conclu- 
sions. First, the West can put together  a large  aid package  without the 
United States having  to provide  a great  deal of direct aid. And second, 
because Japanese  aid will be crucial, Soviet and Russian  leaders have 
very good reason  to reach  a territorial  understanding  with Japan. 
Aid Coordination 
A serious Soviet assistance program  will be on a much larger  scale 
than  any aid  effort  mounted  by the West since the early  fifties.  Technical 
and financial  assistance will be supplied  by a host of Western institu- 
tions: the multilateral  institutions,  Western  governments,  the commer- 
cial private sector, and nongovernmental  organizations.  A multiplicity 
of contacts on both sides is essential if Western  engagement  is to suc- 
ceed in penetrating  deep into the Soviet economy and society. 
There are many overlaps in the responsibilities  of the IMF, World 
Bank, other United Nations agencies, European  Bank for Reconstruc- 
tion  and  Development,  Organization  for Economic  Cooperation  and  De- 
velopment, European  Community,  and the governments  providing  di- 
rect bilateral assistance. These agencies are already competing for 
influence  over the provision of Soviet assistance, and the competition 
will intensify as technical and financial  assistance to the Soviet Union 
grows. Some of this competition  is healthy,  but  most will be counterpro- 
ductive, leading  to duplication  of effort, bureaucratic  infighting,  and  turf 
battles. In addition,  experience in Eastern Europe has shown that the 
competition confuses policymakers in the recipient country and ab- 
sorbs attention  that  would  be better  focused on economic reform. 
The West needs a mechanism  to coordinate  official  assistance. The 
need is temporary  and  requires  no new permanent  agency. A modest of- 
fice, the Office  of Soviet Aid Coordination  (OSAC),  headed  by an expe- 
rienced, authoritative,  and widely respected individual,  could provide 
the coordination  needed. 
OSAC  would  chair  an international  coordinating  committee  of repre- Stanley Fischer  301 
sentatives  from  the major  donor  nations  and  international  financial  agen- 
cies. It would  report  regularly  to the G7. 
OSAC would not be asked to approve the activities of others, but 
would  do the following: 
-assure  that information  on programs, policies, and funding is 
shared; 
-assure  that  duplication  is identified  and  avoided; 
-assist  recipients in identifying  alternative  sources for technically 
suitable  support; 
-assure  that the policy framework  and reform  program,  as defined 
by  the recipient states (USS  and the independent republics) in 
agreement  with  the international  community,  is the framework  within 
which programs  are developed;  and 
-monitor  implementation  of programs  and report regularly  to the 
major  donor  governments  and  the heads of agencies. 
For their  part, the Soviet republics  will also have to coordinate  their 
aid  requests.  The Inter-Republican  Economic  Committee,  which, under 
most reform  plans, will be the coordinating  body for implementing  re- 
forms, is the natural  counterpart  of OSAC. 